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Abstract: 
This article investigates fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession in historical 
perspective.  We explore general trends in the frequency, size and composition of fiscal 
stimulus as well as the impact of government partisanship on fiscal policy outputs during the 
four international recessions of 1980-81, 1990-91, 2001-02 and 2008-09.  Encompassing 17-
23 OECD countries, our analysis calls into question the idea of a general retreat from fiscal 
policy activism since the early 1980s.  The propensity of governments to respond to economic 
downturns by engaging in fiscal stimulus has increased over time and we do not observe any 
secular trend in the size of stimulus measures.  At the same time, OECD governments have 
relied more on tax cuts to stimulate demand in the two recessions of the 2000s than they did 
in the early 1980s or early 1990s.  Regarding government partisanship, we do not find any 
significant direct partisan effects on either the size or the composition of fiscal stimulus for 
any of the four recession episodes.  However, the size of the welfare state conditioned the 
impact of government partisanship in the two recessions of the 2000s, with Left-leaning 
governments distinctly more prone to engage in discretionary fiscal stimulus and/or spending 
increases in large welfare states, but not in small welfare states. 
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Introduction 
 
The politics of macro-economic management featured prominently in the comparative 
political economy literature of the 1980s.  From the mid-1990s onwards, however, the 
concerns of comparative political economists have focused on other issues, notably skill 
formation, social protection and redistribution.  Many political economists seem to have 
become convinced that governments are no longer willing or able to respond to economic 
downturns by engaging in fiscal stimulus.  Yet virtually all OECD governments resorted, 
albeit briefly, to deficit spending during the Great Recession of 2008-09.  In light of this 
experience, it is time, we think, to bring macro-economic policy, and fiscal policy in 
particular, back to the center-stage of comparative political economy.1 
 Building on Pontusson and Raess (2012), this article situates fiscal policy responses to 
the Great Recession in historical perspective.  We engage in a multifaceted descriptive 
analysis of fiscal policy responses to the four international recessions that the OECD 
countries have experienced since 1980, i.e., the recessions of 1980-81, 1990-91, 2001-02 and 
2008-09.  Our goal is to explore broad patterns of change over time, across many OECD 
countries.  To this end, we must necessarily rely on quantitative data and ignore the intricacies 
of policy-making and specific policy choices.  Encompassing 17-23 OECD countries, the 
fiscal policy data that we present have been adjusted for the budgetary effects of cyclical 
economic fluctuations and thus pertain to the fiscal outcomes produced by discretionary 
government decisions or, in other words, ‘discretionary fiscal policy outputs’. 
 We begin by situating our approach in relation to existing literature.  The empirical 
analysis that follows is organized into two parts: first, we explore general trends in fiscal 
policy responses to economic downturns since 1980; and, secondly, we explore changes over 
time in the impact of government partisanship on fiscal policy outputs.  General trends and 
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partisan effects ought to be considered in tandem, for the absence of partisan effects might 
signify either of two very different scenarios: (a) all governments, regardless of partisan 
colors, respond to recessions by engaging in fiscal stimulus or (b) all governments instead 
pursue pro-cyclical policies.2 
 With respect to government partisanship as well as general trends, our discussion 
addresses three separate questions.  The first question concerns the frequency of fiscal 
stimulus in response to economic downturns.  Have governments become less inclined to 
undertake stimulus measures?  At any given point in time, are Left-leaning governments more 
likely to undertake fiscal stimulus measures than Right-leaning governments?  The second 
question concerns the size of fiscal stimulus.  When governments choose to stimulate 
domestic demand, how aggressively do they do so?  Do Left-leaning governments differ from 
Right-leaning governments in this respect?  Finally, we consider the composition of fiscal 
stimulus, conceived in terms of the mix of spending increases and tax cuts.  Have 
governments come to rely more on tax cuts over time?  Do Left-leaning governments favor 
spending increases while Right-leaning governments favor tax cuts? 
 To anticipate, the data presented below call into question the idea of a general retreat 
from fiscal policy activism since the early 1980s.  The propensity of governments to respond 
to economic downturns by engaging in fiscal stimulus has actually increased across the four 
international recessions included in our analysis and we do not observe any secular trend in 
the size of fiscal stimulus measures.  At the same time, our data indicate that most OECD 
governments relied more on tax cuts to stimulate demand in the early 2000s and in the Great 
Recession than they did in the early 1980s and 1990s. 
 We explore the role of government partisanship descriptively, but also estimate simple 
cross-section regression models for each of the four recession episodes, with Left parties’ 
share of cabinet portfolios as the independent variable of primary interest.  While our 
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descriptive analysis suggests that Left-leaning governments have often behaved differently 
than Right-leaning governments, our regression analysis does not yield any significant 
partisan effects.  Adding further complexity, we explore the implications of public welfare 
provisions for the partisan politics of fiscal policy during economic downturns.  Generous 
public provisions cushion the impact of economic downturns on citizens and arguably reduce 
the pressure on elected officials to engage in fiscal stimulus.  Does this logic affect governing 
parties of the Left and the Right differently?  Our analysis suggests that the answer is ‘no’ for 
the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s.  For the recession of the early 2000s, however, 
we find that Left-leaning governments were significantly more likely than Right-leaning 
governments to engage in fiscal stimulus and to rely on spending increases as the source of 
fiscal stimulus in large welfare states.  In the Great Recession, Left-leaning and Right-leaning 
governments in large welfare states diverged with respect to the reliance on spending 
increases to stimulate the economy, but not with respect to the size of fiscal stimulus. 
 
 
Existing literature and working hypotheses 
 
The emphasis on supply-side and distributive issues in recent comparative political economy 
appears to be motivated by a common belief that governments have retreated from fiscal 
policy activism.   Several broad arguments have been advanced to explain the supposed 
retreat from fiscal policy activism or, in other words, the abandonment of the Keynesian 
policy paradigm of the trentes glorieuses.  Some scholars (e.g., McNamara 1998; Blyth 2002) 
emphasize ideational paradigm changes among economists and other policy experts.  Recent 
research in this vein has documented the ascendancy of the idea of ‘expansionary fiscal 
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contraction’ and its role in the general turn to austerity in 2010 (Blyth 2013; Dellepiane-
Avellaneda 2014). 
 Other scholars propose more structuralist explanations of the retreat from fiscal policy 
activism.  One prominent idea along these lines is that increased dependence on trade reduces 
the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus.  As trade increases, fiscal stimulus increasingly benefits 
foreign producers, via demand for imported goods and services, while its negative 
consequences for export competitiveness matter more to the economy as a whole.  In the 
absence of international coordination, something of a prisoner’s dilemma arises as each 
government waits for its trade partners to undertake stimulus measures (Cameron 2012).  It is 
also commonplace to argue that the internationalization of financial markets has constrained 
the ability of governments to pursue countercyclical fiscal policies or, more precisely, the 
cost-benefit calculus involved.  In a world of capital mobility, interest-rate premiums on fresh 
borrowing by highly indebted governments arguably motivates governments to run smaller 
public-sector deficits (Garrett 1998). 
 Yet another line of argument is that welfare-state expansion over the period 1960-90 
has rendered discretionary fiscal policy activism unnecessary.  Welfare states not only 
cushion the impact of unemployment on individuals and thus protect incumbent governments 
from electoral punishment when unemployment rises, but also stimulate domestic demand 
through the mechanism of ‘automatic stabilizers’ (see Darby & Melitz 2008; Auerbach et al. 
2010).  Economic openness and welfare-state expansion might be invoked not only to explain 
a general retreat from fiscal policy activism, but also to explain cross-national variation 
around this general trend.  Everything else being equal, conventional wisdom suggests that 
open economies with large welfare states will be less prone to respond to economic 
downturns by engaging in fiscal stimulus than countries that are less open and provide less of 
a social safety net. 
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 European Monetary Union (EMU) features prominently as constraint on fiscal 
expansion in ‘ideationalist’ as well as ‘structuralist’ accounts of European responses to the 
Great Recession.  For example, Cameron (2012) invokes the deficit restrictions of the Growth 
and Stability Pact to explain why EU member states engaged in less fiscal stimulus than the 
United States in 2008-09 and were quicker to apply the breaks in 2010.  However, one must 
also keep in mind that the restrictions of EMU were put in place precisely because member 
states would not be able to use monetary and exchange rate policy and might thus be expected 
to rely more heavily on fiscal policy to stimulate domestic demand (Iversen & Soskice 2012). 
 As noted at the outset, we seek to go beyond existing literature by analyzing cross-
temporal and cross-national variation in the composition of fiscal stimulus as well as the 
frequency and size of fiscal stimulus.  Needless to say perhaps, governments may stimulate 
domestic demand either by increasing spending or cutting taxes, or by some mixture of the 
two.  Based on a handful of country cases, Pontusson and Raess (2012) suggest that, 
irrespective of their partisan composition, governments relied more heavily on tax cuts to 
stimulate the economy during the Great Recession of 2008-09 than they did during the ‘Long 
Recession’ of the 1970s.   The contrast with the 1970s is particularly striking in the Swedish 
case: Center-Right coalition governments responded to the downturn of 1976-77 with deficit 
spending and subsequently closed the deficit by raising taxes while a new Center-Right 
coalition government responded to the downturn of 2008-09 by cutting taxes and relied 
heavily on spending cuts to restore budget balance in 2010-11.   
 In what follows, we seek to assess whether the Swedish case is emblematic of a 
general shift from ‘social Keynesianism’ to ‘liberal Keynesianism’.  Our expectation that this 
is indeed the case follows from the observations that real estate and financial assets have 
become increasingly important to the life-time income of middle-income households and that 
asset bubbles have featured prominently in recent recessions.  To the extent that employment 
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insecurity has become, in relative terms, less important to pivotal middle-income voters, tax 
cuts arguably represent a more efficient way for incumbent government to protect themselves 
against electoral backlash during economic downturns (see Ansell 2012a; 2012b).  
 This brings us to the question of government partisanship.  The ‘old’ literature on the 
political economy of macro-economic management, most notably Hibbs (1977), posits that 
parties of the Left and the Right have systematically different macro-economic priorities 
because their core electoral constituencies differ (see also Garrett 1998).  Representing voters 
whose income derives primarily from employment, Left parties prioritize fighting 
unemployment.  By comparison, voters with financial assets are more important to Right 
parties and consequently these parties care more about price stability.  The implication of this 
reasoning is that Left governments should be more likely than Right governments to engage 
in fiscal stimulus during economic downturns.  Assuming, reasonably, that spending on 
unemployment benefits and other compensatory programs primarily benefit low-income 
households while the benefits of tax cuts are spread more evenly across the income 
distribution, the same logic would also lead us to expect that Left governments will rely more 
on spending increases while Right governments will rely more on tax cuts to stimulate 
domestic demand during economic downturns.  
 We are particularly interested in the question of whether the effects of government 
partisanship have changed over time.  If it is indeed the case that the political-economic 
environment has become less permissive of fiscal policy activism, it stands to reason that 
partisan differences over the appropriate amount of fiscal stimulus during economic 
downturns have diminished.  In a different vein, Rueda (2007) argues that growing labor-
market dualization renders Hibbs’ partisan model of the macro-economic management, based 
on the distinction between wage-earners and asset-owners, outdated.  In Rueda’s alternative 
model, labor-market ‘insiders’, who are protected against business-cycle fluctuations in the 
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rate of unemployment, constitute the core constituency of mainstream Left parties these days.  
The implication is that, over time, Left parties (governments) have become less concerned 
with increases in the rate of unemployment and therefore less prone to engage in fiscal 
stimulus.  Rueda’s argumentation might also be taken to imply that Left governments have 
become more favorable to tax cuts (rather than spending on unemployment benefits) as a 
means to stimulate aggregate demand. 
 In an important new book, Starke et al. (2013) argue that generous social welfare 
provisions not only reduce the need for fiscal policy activism during recessions, but also 
reduce partisan conflict over fiscal policy responses to recessions.  Based on case studies of 
policy change in Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden during the recessions of the 
1970s, the early 1990s, and 2008-2009, Starke et al. (2013: 179-180) propose the following 
generalization: 
 … there are two types of crisis management, depending on the size of the welfare 
state. In large welfare states, crisis management relies on automatic stabilizers. It 
usually involves a relatively consensual adjustment of specific social policy 
instruments, often targeted at vulnerable groups in the labour market. In smaller 
welfare states, crisis management is based more on discretionary macro-
stabilization. It is more conflictual, as it concerns the very shape of the welfare 
state. Additional spending needs to be explicitly devoted to welfare measures via 
‘crisis packages’. Hence, there is a higher probability that these measures become 
subject to partisan struggles. 
For Starke and his co-authors, partisan effects on discretionary fiscal policy outcomes 
should be less pronounced in large welfare states than in small welfare states.  In our view, 
however, it is equally plausible to suppose that partisanship matters more in large welfare 
states than in small welfare states.  The absence of a strong safety net exposes incumbent 
governments to the threat of electoral backlash during economic downturns.  As a result, we 
hypothesize, Right-leaning governments will be more likely to adopt expansionary fiscal 
policies that run counter to the interests of their core constituencies or, in other words, to 
behave more like Left-leaning governments.  Put the other way around, generous public 
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welfare provisions reduce the electoral pressure on Right-leaning governments to engage in 
fiscal stimulus and compensatory spending, allowing them to adopt fiscal policy responses 
that correspond more closely to the interests of their core constituencies.3  
 Left parties can usefully be conceived as electoral coalitions of (a) private-sector 
workers with an interest in social protection and redistribution by virtue of their labor-market 
status, (b) public-sector employees who benefit from public spending in terms of wages and 
employment security, and (c) a wide range of individuals for whom government transfers 
represent a major source of income.  Workers in sectors exposed to international competition 
have an interest in social protection, but they also have reason to worry about the implications 
of deficit spending for competitiveness.  This is less obviously the case for public-sector 
employees and other ‘welfare-state clienteles’ (Pierson 2001).  The relative size of these 
different constituencies of Left parties varies as a function of the size of the welfare state.  In 
large welfare states, we hypothesize, Left parties will be less sensitive to the competitiveness 
concerns of exposed sectors, especially export-oriented industries and their employees.  
Relative to Left-leaning governments in small welfare states, Left-leaning governments in 
large welfare states might thus be expected to adopt more expansionary fiscal policy in 
response to economic downturns.4 
 Our discussion sets aside the question of varieties of capitalism and their implications 
for macro-economic policy choices.  The argument that ‘liberal market economies’ tend to 
pursue more expansionary macro-economic policies than ‘coordinated market economies’ 
(Soskice 2007; Iversen & Soskice 2012) involves social protection and economic openness, 
which we include as control variables in our regression analysis.  Whether or not we gain 
analytical leverage by treating these variables as complementary components of different 
political-economy clusters is a complicated question that we cannot pursue here.5  Due to 
space limitations and our small number of observations, we also ignore the distinction 
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between single-party and coalition governments.  For a sample of thirty-four countries, 
Armingeon (2012) shows convincingly that one-party governments were more likely to 
pursue expansionary fiscal policies than coalition governments in 2008-09.  Soskice may well 
be right that governments in CMEs behave differently from governments in LMEs, and 
Armingeon may be right that coalition governments behave differently from single-party 
governments, but there is no obvious reason why either of these claims being true would call 
into the question the findings we present below. 
 
 
Empirics I: General trends 
 
To assess general trends in fiscal policy responses to economic downturns, we engage in two 
complementary exercises.  To begin with, we look at changes in fiscal policy during single or 
consecutive years in which more than two-thirds of the countries in our dataset experienced 
year-on-year decelerations in (real) GDP growth.6  Defined in this manner, the international 
recession years in our dataset are 1981, 1990-91, 2001 and 2008-09.  Some countries did not 
experience recessions in the technical sense (two consecutive quarters of negative growth) 
during these years, and some countries experienced recessions at other times, but there can be 
little doubt that these years are indeed the years since 1980 in which the OECD area as a 
whole experienced major economic downturns.  Focusing on OECD-wide downturns, we 
assume that governments consider economic conditions abroad in making fiscal policy 
decisions.  To take into account cross-national differences in the timing of the business cycle, 
the second exercise reports on the frequency, size and composition of stimulus measures over 
more extended time periods, varying between three and five years. 
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Taken from the OECD, the measure of discretionary fiscal stimulus on which we rely 
refers to year-on-year changes in the ‘underlying government primary balance’, expressed in 
percent of potential GDP.7  Based on econometric estimates, this measure adjusts for 
fluctuations in government expenditures and revenues due to the business cycle and thus 
pertains to changes in expenditures and revenues that can be attributed to government 
decisions.  Essentially, the measure captures changes in expenditures and revenues that cannot 
be explained by rising claims for social benefits at constant benefits generosity and falling 
revenues at constant tax rates.  It also eliminates one-off fiscal operations that distort the 
accuracy of cyclically-adjusted fiscal balances (OECD 2008).  Most notably, the public 
expenditure figures used by the OECD to estimate the underlying primary balance do not 
include the massive capital payments associated with the bailout of financial institutions in 
2008-09. 
  For seventeen countries, the OECD provides annual data on the underlying 
government primary balance from 1980 onwards.  Another six countries (Germany, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal and Switzerland) enter the OECD dataset in the 1990s.  
We will include these six countries in our analysis of determinants of fiscal policy responses 
to the recessions of 2001-02 and 2008-09, but for the sake of comparability our descriptive 
analysis of general trends focuses on the seventeen countries for which we have measures of 
discretionary fiscal policy going back to 1980. 
 As a first cut, Table 1 presents annualized measures of discretionary fiscal stimulus for 
1981, 1990-91, 2001 and 2008-09.  Positive numbers mean that the underlying government 
primary balance moved towards deficit, stimulating domestic demand.  The data clearly call 
into question the idea of a general retreat from fiscal policy activism.  Of the seventeen 
countries for which we have a complete data series, eleven pursued contractionary fiscal 
policies in 1981, three in 1990-91, four in 2001, and zero in 2008-09.  Among the full set of 
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twenty-three countries, Switzerland alone did not engage in fiscal stimulus in 2008-09.  
Judging by the unweighted 17-country averages reported at the bottom of Table 1, the size of 
the fiscal stimulus packages implemented by OECD governments also appear to have 
increased over the four recessions since 1980.  On average, EMU countries stimulated less 
than non-EMU countries during recessions since 2000, but it is noteworthy that the difference 
between EMU and non-EMU countries was bigger in 2001 than in 2008-09. 
[Table 1] 
The Great Recession was much deeper than the recessions of the early 1980s, early 
1990s and early 2000s.  By comparison to earlier recessions, the Great Recession was also 
more uniform in the sense that all OECD economies entered into recession and began to 
recover at more or less the same time.  Some of the countries with negative numbers for 1981 
in Table 1 were experiencing acceleration of GDP growth and thus did not, strictly speaking, 
pursue ‘pro-cyclical’ policies.  In retrospect, fiscal policy responses to the recession of the 
early 1980s still stand out as quite exceptional, reflecting the breakthrough of monetarist ideas 
and the leadership of the newly-elected governments of Thatcher and Reagan.  
In admittedly crude fashion, Table 2 takes into account the extent of economic 
downturns.  For countries characterized by fiscal stimulus as well as deceleration in GDP 
growth over the one- or two-year window, the figures in this table are the product of dividing 
the fiscal stimulus by the size of the GDP deceleration.  In other words, they represent the 
discretionary fiscal stimulus associated with a one-percentage-point contraction of GDP.8  By 
this measure, the average fiscal policy response to the Great Recession is no longer 
particularly expansionary.  Adjusting for GDP contraction, OECD governments that did 
stimulate did so more aggressively in the early 1980s than in subsequent recessions.  On 
average, however, fiscal policy was more expansionary in 2001 and in 2008-09 than in 1990-
91.  To summarize, the data presented in Tables 1-2 convey two main points.  First, the 
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propensity of OECD governments to respond to international recessions by engaging in fiscal 
stimulus has increased over time.  Secondly, taking the extent of economic downturns into 
account, we do not observe any secular trend in the size of stimulus measures. 
[Table 2] 
 Table 3 addresses changes in the composition of fiscal stimulus, measured by the mix 
of spending increases and tax cuts employed by governments to stimulate aggregate demand.  
For all cases in which governments engaged in discretionary fiscal stimulus, this table shows 
the contribution of discretionary changes in government expenditures to the change in the 
government primary balance over one or two years.  The figures have been ‘censored’ to 
range between zero and 100%.  Whether expenditures were constant or reduced, their 
contribution to the stimulus equals zero if tax cuts equal or exceed the total stimulus.  
Conversely, the contribution of spending increases equals 100% if spending increases equal 
or exceed the total stimulus.  
[Table 3] 
With the exception of Norway, governments that pursued expansionary fiscal policies 
in 1981 relied more or less exclusively on spending increases to stimulate aggregate demand.  
In 1990-91, Denmark, Japan, Sweden and the US primarily stimulated aggregate demand 
through tax cuts, but ten of the fourteen countries that pursued expansionary fiscal policies 
over these two years still relied more or less exclusively on spending increases to stimulate 
aggregate demand.  In marked contrast, tax cuts became part of the stimulus repertoire of 
almost all countries in 2001.  Relative to the previous recession, the contribution of spending 
to the stimulus was, on average, bigger in 2008-09.  In our view, however, the important point 
is that tax cuts have featured more prominently in the two recessions of the 2000s than they 
did in the early 1980s or early 1990s. 
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The results of our second exercise, which considers fiscal policy changes over more 
extended ‘recession episodes’, are summarized in Table 4.  The figures in this table refer to 
yearly observations of changes in fiscal policy for the seventeen countries for which we have 
data going back to 1980.  For each recession episode, the window of analysis includes the first 
year in which two-thirds of the countries experienced acceleration in GDP growth (1984, 
1994, 2004 and 2010).  For the Great Recession, this yields a window of three years, for a 
total of 51 country-years.  Reflecting the uneven and protracted character of the international 
recession of the early 1990s, we end up with a five-year window and a total of 85 country-
years for the early 1990s.  For the early 1980s and early 2000s alike, we have four-year 
windows (68 country-years).  For each recession episode, we categorize country-years based 
on two criteria: (1) whether or not GDP growth decelerated and (2) whether or not 
governments engaged in discretionary fiscal stimulus. 
[Table 4] 
 Table 4 confirms that the frequency of fiscal stimulus in response to economic 
downturns increased steadily across our four recession episodes.  This observation holds even 
if we discount the exceptional experience of the early 1980s.  During the early 1990s, 
governments engaged in fiscal stimulus in 59% of all years in which GDP growth decelerated.  
For 2008-10, the corresponding figure is 86%.  On average, governments that engaged in 
fiscal stimulus in 2008-10 did so on a bigger scale than in previous recessions.  Table 4 also 
confirms that tax cuts have been a more important instrument of fiscal stimulus in the two 
most recent recessions.  
 The figures for average size of stimulus reported in Table 4 do not take into account 
the extent of economic downturns.  What distinguishes the Great Recession, it seems, is first 
and foremost the consistency with which OECD governments responded by engaging in fiscal 
stimulus (not a more aggressive deployment of fiscal stimulus).  The Great Recession is also 
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distinguished by the low frequency of fiscal stimulus in years when GDP accelerated.  In a 
temporal sense, fiscal stimulus measures were better targeted in 2008-10 than in earlier 
recessions, i.e., governments were more likely to stimulate in downturns and less likely to 
stimulate in upturns.  
 Might the consistency of fiscal policy responses in 2008-10 and their more targeted 
nature be attributed to international coordination?  As detailed by Helleiner (2012), Cameron 
(2012) and Dellepiane-Avellaneda (2014) the G20 and the EU both endorsed fiscal stimulus 
as the ‘correct crisis response’ in 2008, but there is very little evidence to suggest that any 
government implemented expansionary fiscal policies in response to international pressure.  It 
is noteworthy that IMF/EU bailouts in 2008-10 imposed austerity on Iceland, Greece and 
Ireland and that fiscal policy responses in the Eurozone countries—presumably the countries 
most capable of engaging in macro-economic coordination—were, on average, less 
expansionary than in other OECD countries. 
 For the most part, ‘self-interested’ calculations by domestic political actors explain the 
fiscal stimulus measures implemented in 2008-09.  However, the experience of the Great 
Recession suggests that the implications of globalization for fiscal policy responses to 
economic downturns may be more ambiguous than conventional wisdom would have it.  
Everything else being equal, domestic demand stimulation surely makes less sense for more 
export-oriented economies.  On the other hand, globalization arguably renders fiscal stimulus 
in response to downturns more likely because it entails greater synchronization of business 
cycles. Two distinct arguments along these lines seem very plausible: first, synchronization of 
business cycles enables governments to gauge more accurately where they are in the cycle; 
and, secondly, synchronization renders the macro-economic policies of trading partners more 
predictable. For either or both reasons, globalization might produce fiscal policy behavior that 
appears to be coordinated.   
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Empirics II:  Government partisanship 
 
Let us now turn to the comparison of partisan effects across the four recession episodes since 
1980.  The setup of Table 5 is the same as that of Table 4, but we now distinguish between 
country-years with Left and non-Left governments.  Following common practice in the 
comparative political economy and welfare-state literature, our measure of government 
partisanship is the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by Left parties, with Greens and left-
socialist parties as well as social democratic labor parties classified as ‘Left parties’.  The 
results presented here are based on coding the US Democrats and Canadian Liberals as 
‘centrist’ or, in other words, as ‘non-Left’ parties, but we obtain very similar results with 
these parties coded as ‘Left’. 9 
 On the assumption that discretionary changes in expenditures and revenues in a given 
year are affected by decisions made in the previous year, we code as ‘Left government’ all 
country-years in which Left parties held more than 50% of cabinet portfolios in the year in 
question and the previous year.   Table 5 indicates that Left governments were more likely to 
respond to economic downturns by engaging in fiscal stimulus than non-Left governments in 
2001-2004, but they were less likely to do so in 1981-84, and more or less equally likely to do 
so in 1990-94 and 2008-10. Left governments appear to have stimulated on a considerably 
bigger scale than non-Left governments during the Great Recession but this is not the case for 
earlier recessions.  Indeed, the opposite seems to be the case for the early 1980s.10 
[Table 5] 
In years when GDP growth accelerated, Left governments were more prone to pursue 
expansionary fiscal policies than non-Left governments prior the Great Recession.  Arguably, 
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Left governments have historically been more inclined to sustain economic recovery by fiscal 
stimulus.  During the Great Recession, however, Left governments appear to have been 
somewhat more prone than non-Left governments to retreat from fiscal stimulus when 
domestic economic conditions improved.  Finally, the last row of Table 5 indicates that 
spending increases accounted, on average, for a higher share of fiscal stimulus under Left 
governments than under non-Left governments in the early 1990s and especially the early 
2000s, but not during the Great Recession.  The overall shift towards greater reliance on tax 
cuts to stimulate domestic demand appears to have been spearheaded by non-Left 
governments and initially resisted by Left governments. 
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of estimating simple cross-sectional OLS models with 
change in the government primary balance and change in cyclically-adjusted expenditures as 
dependent variables.  Depending on the recession episode, change is measured over the same 
one- or two-year window for all countries (as in Table 1-3).  For all four recessions, we report 
results based on data for seventeen countries.  For the two most recent recessions, we also 
report results estimated with data for twenty-three countries.11 
[Tables 6 and 7] 
The independent variable of primary interest is government partisanship, measured as 
the average percentage of cabinet portfolios held by Left parties over the recession year(s) in 
question and the year preceding the recession (i.e., over two years for 1981 and 2001 or over 
three years for 1990-91 and 2008-09).  Given the small number of observations, we include 
only four control variables: (1) non-elderly social spending in percent of GDP prior to the 
recession (e.g., 2007 for 2008-09); (2) change in GDP growth from the pre-recession year to 
the first year of the recession (e.g., from 2007 to 2008); (3) the level of public debt in the year 
prior to the downturn (e.g., 2007); and (4) economic globalization in the year prior to the 
downturn.12 
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 The coefficients for the control variables tend to be correctly signed but are seldom 
significant.  Deceleration of GDP growth turns out to be a significant predictor of fiscal 
stimulus and spending growth only for the early 1980s and the constraints of public debt are 
only significant for 1990-91 and 2001.  Governments in large welfare states were significantly 
less likely to stimulate and increase spending in 1981 and 2001, but not in 1990-91 and 2008-
09.    
 With the 23-country sample as well as the 17-country sample, we do not obtain any 
significant direct effects of government partisanship.  Simply put, it does not appear to be the 
case that more Left-leaning governments consistently pursued more expansionary fiscal 
policies or relied more heavily on expenditure increases to stimulate aggregate demand during 
any of these recession episodes.13 
 The analysis presented in Tables 6-7 is based on one- or two-year windows and fails to 
capture what is arguably the main difference between Left and non-Left governments 
displayed in Table 5, namely the greater propensity of Left governments, in the early 1990s 
and the early 2000s, to pursue fiscal stimulus for longer periods of time or, in other words, to 
sustain economic recovery by means of fiscal stimulus (and public spending in particular).14  
In future work, we plan to explore this question by engaging in pooled cross-section time-
series analysis of fiscal policy responses to changes in GDP growth across the entire period 
1981-2010. 
 Adding an interaction between government partisanship and non-elderly social 
spending in percent of GDP to the models reported in Table 6 yields a statistically significant 
interaction effect for the early 2000s, but not for previous recessions nor for the Great 
Recession of 2008-09.  In large welfare states, Left-leaning governments stimulated more in 
response to economic downturns than Right-leaning governments in 2001.15  For 2001 and 
2008-09, we also observe a statistically significant effect of interacting these two variables in 
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the models with discretionary change in government expenditures as the dependent variable 
(see Table 7).  In large welfare states, Left-leaning governments relied more on spending 
increases to stimulate aggregate demand than Right-leaning governments did in 2001 and 
2008-09, but not in the early 1980s or the early 1990s.16  Based on the last model presented in 
Table 7, Figure 1 shows the estimated conditional effects of government partisanship at 
different levels of non-elderly social spending in percent of GDP during the Great Recession.  
[Figure 1] 
Is welfare-state size a proxy for labor encompassment?  In that case, the positive 
interaction between size of the welfare state and government partisanship could be interpreted 
as confirmation of Garrett’s (1998) thesis that encompassing unions willing to engage in wage 
restraint allow Left governments to stimulate growth through government spending.  Testing 
this idea by substituting labor encompassment for non-elderly social spending, we have not 
found any significant interaction between labor encompassment and government partisanship 
for either 2001 or 2008-09.17  
Table 8 explores the partisan politicization of spending choices during the Great 
Recession further.  Leaving aside three countries in which government partisanship changed 
in the course of 2008-09 (Iceland, Italy and New Zealand), this table sorts the remaining 20 
countries on two dimensions: first, by the level of non-elderly social spending in 2007 
(vertical axis); and, secondly, by the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by Left parties in 
2008-09 (horizontal axis).  We report the change in cyclically-adjusted government 
expenditures over 2008-09 for each country and the average for each constellation of 
government partisanship and non-elderly social spending.18 
[Table 8] 
Among large welfare states, we observe a marked difference in spending growth 
between countries with some Left participation in government and those without any Left 
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participation.  We also observe that Left majority governments were more spending-prone 
than coalition governments with Left parties.  (This is particularly true if we disregard the 
case of Luxembourg).  Among small welfare states, by contrast, non-Left governments were 
nearly as spending-prone as Left governments.  Conversely, Table 8 shows that Left 
governments in large welfare states were significantly more spending-prone than Left 
governments in small welfare states and that non-Left governments in small welfare states 
were significantly more spending-prone than non-Left governments in large welfare states.  
As noted at the outset, social protection might promote partisan differentiation for 
either of two reasons.  On the one hand, it might cushion the social impact of economic 
downturns and their electoral consequences for incumbent governments, leading Right-
leaning government to eschew compensatory spending measures.  On the other hand, large 
welfare-state constituencies might generate electoral incentives for Left-leaning government 
to be more ‘leftist’.  The evidence in Table 8 suggests that both mechanisms are in play or, in 
other words, that the size of the welfare state conditions the behavior of both Left and Right 
parties. 
Our findings concerning the conditions effects of the welfare state contradict the core 
argument of Starke et al. (2013).19  They also raise questions about Rueda’s (2007) implicit 
claim that labor-market dualization reduces partisan differences over policy responses to 
rising unemployment.  Much of the literature on dualization, including Rueda’s own work, 
indicates that countries with large welfare states have undergone more labor-market 
dualization than countries with small welfare states.  Yet it is precisely in these countries that 
we observe partisan differentiation with regard to discretionary spending during the Great 
Recession.  Substituting a measure of labor-market dualization for the size of the welfare 
state, we find, for both recessions in the 2000s, that the interaction with government 
partisanship has a positive coefficient while the coefficient for government partisanship itself 
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is negative.20  Neither coefficient clears conventional thresholds of statistical significance, but 
these results (available upon request) run counter to the idea that partisan differences over 
spending diminish with dualization. 
 
 
Concluding remarks  
 
To summarize, we do not find any evidence of a general retreat from fiscal policy activism 
over the time period covered by our analysis.  Over time, governments across the OECD area 
have become more prone to engage in fiscal stimulus in response to economic downturns.  
Taking the size of economic downturns into account, there is no OECD-wide trend in the 
amount of stimulus undertaken by governments that pursue counter-cyclical fiscal policies.  
Regarding the composition of fiscal policy, we find that tax cuts have featured more 
prominently in the two most recent recessions than they did in earlier recessions.  We do find 
some direct partisan effects on fiscal policy choices, but these effects are not very large or 
robust, and primarily pertain to the greater willingness of Left government to increase 
discretionary spending as the economy begins to recover.  Most intriguingly, our analysis 
indicates that the size of the welfare state conditioned the impact of government partisanship 
in the two recessions of the 2000s.  In large welfare states, but not in small welfare states, 
Left-leaning governments were more prone to engage in discretionary fiscal stimulus as well 
as spending increases than Right-leaning governments during the recession of the early 2000s.  
In large welfare states, Left-leaning governments were again significantly more likely than 
Right-leaning governments to rely on spending increases as a means to stimulate demand 
during the Great Recession. 
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Why do we not observe any significant conditioning effects of the welfare state in 
earlier recession episodes?  There are two alternative ways of approaching this question that 
ought to be pursued.  One approach focuses on the political-economic dynamics of specific 
recession episodes.  For example, the early 2000s were characterized by the dominance of 
Left governments across Western Europe.  Left-leaning governments were in power in the 
three largest European economies (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) and other 
large welfare states (Belgium and the Netherlands as well as the Nordic countries).  It is 
plausible that policy coordination among these governments reduced the collective action 
problems associated with fiscal stimulus in an open economy.  During the Great Recession, 
government interventions to rescue the financial sector featured prominently.  Studies of 
banking bailouts have shown that Left governments were no less likely than non-Left 
governments to provide larger rescue packages to troubled banks (Weber & Schmitz 2011; 
Ansell 2012a; Grossman & Woll 2014), but Left governments arguably faced stronger 
political pressures to deliver compensatory benefits to wage-earners. 
In a different, more ‘generalist’ vein, globalization pressures might plausibly be 
invoked to explain our findings.  Our analysis shows that globalization provides little 
explanatory leverage on cross-national variation in fiscal policy responses to recessions.  
However, all OECD countries have become more exposed to the global economy since 1980.  
Furthermore, the competitive pressures associated with openness have increased since the 
early 1990s, with the formation of the Eurozone, the rise of emerging market economies and 
the volatility of global financial markets.  These developments may have been a source of 
intensified partisan conflict over fiscal policy in large welfare states.  In future research, we 
plan to explore the three-way interaction of government partisanship, welfare-state generosity 
and globalization through a quantitative analysis of fiscal policy outputs over the entire period 
since 1980.  
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Table 1.  Annual average change in the discretionary fiscal balance 
 1981 1990-91 2001 2008-09 
     
Australia  0.5 1.5 0.9 2.6 
Austria  -1.4 0.1 -2.3 0.7 
Belgium -0.1 0.2 -0.3 1.6 
Canada  -2.2 0.4 2.4 2.0 
Denmark -0.2 1.0 1.2 1.9 
Finland -2.0 2.1 1.8 1.9 
France  1.1 0.5 0.0 1.3 
Germany . . 1.8 0.5 
Greece 4.3 -2.1 0.5 2.3 
Iceland . -1.0 2.5 3.7 
Ireland  -0.2 1.0 4.1 2.3 
Italy  3.1 -1.1 1.1 0.7 
Japan  -0.8 0.3 -0.5 1.9 
Luxembourg . . 1.2 0.7 
Netherlands  -0.9 -0.5 2.0 2.1 
New Zealand . 0.5 0.3 2.6 
Norway  1.0 1.9 1.3 1.1 
Portugal . 1.3 1.2 2.3 
Spain  0.1 1.0 -0.1 4.5 
Sweden  -1.0 1.8 1.9 0.1 
Switzerland . . 1.5 -0.3 
United Kingdom  -1.8 1.3 0.8 2.4 
United States -1.0 0.1 2.0 3.0 
     
17-country 
average  
EMU average 
Non-EMU average 
-0.1 0.6 1.0 
 
 
0.9 
1.3 
1.9 
 
 
1.7 
1.9 
 
Note: Averages are unweighted.
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Table 2.  Discretionary fiscal stimulus per one-percent contraction in GDP growth 
 1981 1990-91 2001 2008-09 
     
Australia . 0.9 . 3.6 
Austria . . . 0.2 
Belgium . 0.3 . 0.6 
Canada . 0.1 0.7 0.8 
Denmark . . 0.4 0.5 
Finland . 0.4 0.6 0.3 
France 1.6 0.3 0.0 0.5 
Germany . . 1.2 0.1 
Greece 1.9 . 1.9 0.7 
Iceland . . 6.1 0.6 
Ireland . 0.5 0.9 0.4 
Italy 1.2 . 0.6 0.2 
Japan . 0.3 . 0.5 
Luxembourg . . 0.2 0.1 
Netherlands . . 1.0 0.6 
New Zealand . 0.8 . 2.5 
Norway 0.3 . 1.1 0.5 
Portugal . 1.2 0.6 0.9 
Spain 0.0 0.9 . 1.3 
Sweden . 0.9 0.6 0.0 
Switzerland . . 0.6 . 
United Kingdom . 0.7 0.6 0.6 
United States . 0.1 0.6 1.2 
     
17-country 
average  
 
EMU average 
Non-EMU average 
Non-EMU average 
w/o Iceland 
1.0 0.5 0.8 
 
 
0.8 
1.3 
0.7 
0.7 
 
 
0.5 
1.1 
 
Note:  A country-year has a missing value if GDP growth accelerated and/or if there was 
no stimulus.   
 
Source:  The data on GDP growth (expenditure approach) are from OECD.Stat. 
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Table 3.  Contribution of spending increases to stimulus 
 1981 1990-91 2001 2008-09 
     
Australia 63.5 59.3 2.7 45.0 
Austria * 100 * 100 
Belgium * 100 * 92.3 
Canada * 100 46.6 74.7 
Denmark * 0 32.1 50.9 
Finland * 100 0 74.3 
France 100 100 0 41.9 
Germany . . 0 100 
Greece 86.2 * 16.5 70.9 
Iceland . * 25.7 0 
Ireland * 97.0 51.0 46.1 
Italy 86.9 * 55.3 58.2 
Japan * 10.6 * 54.2 
Luxembourg . . 100 100 
Netherlands * * 29.4 68.2 
New Zealand . 0 0 35.8 
Norway 22.4 100 100 100 
Portugal . 100 67.7 66.0 
Spain 100 100 * 31.3 
Sweden * 27.6 0 0 
Switzerland . . 44.3 * 
United Kingdom * 74.3 100 64.1 
United States * 0 39.2 39.6 
     
17-country 
average  
 
EMU average 
Non-EMU average 
76.5 69.2 36.4 
 
 
35.5 
39.1 
59.5 
 
 
70.8 
46.4 
 
Note: "*" if there was no stimulus.   
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Table 4.  Frequency, size and composition of discretionary fiscal stimulus  
 1981-84 1990-94 2001-04 2008-10 
     
  in deceleration years 35.7% (28) 59.2% (49) 79.5% (39) 85.7% (35) 
  in acceleration years 35.0% (40) 52.8% (36) 55.2% (29) 31.3% (16) 
     
all stimulus years:     
     
  average stimulus  1.01 1.08 1.20 1.93 
   
  contribution of spending to    
stimulus (%) 62.6 68.3 45.6 55.0 
     
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the total number of country-years to which the 
percentages refer. 
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Table 5:  Frequency, size and composition by type of government 
 
 1981-84 1990-94 2001-04 2008-10 
 Left non-Left Left non-Left Left non-Left Left non-Left 
stimulus:          
  in deceleration years 20.0%  
(5) 
39.1% 
(23)  
60.0% 
(15) 
58.8% 
(34) 
93.8% 
(16) 
69.6% 
(23) 
80.0% 
(10) 
88.0% 
(25) 
  in acceleration years 38.5%  
(13) 
33.3% 
(27) 
63.6% 
(11) 
48.0% 
(25) 
83.3%  
(6) 
47.8% 
(23) 
25.0%  
(4) 
33.3% 
(12) 
         
all stimulus years:         
  average stimulus  0.61 1.14 1.12 1.06 1.23 1.19 2.38 1.78 
  contribution of spending to    
stimulus (%) 
 
55.3 
 
65.0 
 
73.0 
 
66.0 
 
53.5 
 
39.8 
 
47.5 
 
57.5 
         
 
Note: See Table 4.  
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Table 6:  Determinants of discretionary stimulus 
 
 1981 1990-91 2001 2008-09 2001 2008-09 2001 2008-09 
         
Left 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.018 -0.106*** 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.017) (0.031) (0.157) 
Non-elderly social spending -0.278* 0.082 -0.285** -0.263 -0.184 -0.186 -0.774*** -0.200 
 (0.135) (0.153) (0.118) (0.264) (0.108) (0.255) (0.178) (0.316) 
Left*spending       0.008*** 0.001 
       (0.002) (0.010) 
         
GDP 
-0.483* 
0.329 
-0.416 0.057 -0.210 -0.198 
0.033 -0.195 
 (0.232) (0.275) (0.236) (0.348) (0.192) (0.347) (0.158) (0.360) 
Debt 0.024 -0.059*** -0.019* -0.025 -0.012 -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) (0.022) (0.008) (0.024) 
Globalization -0.016 0.048 0.036 -0.039 0.020 -0.037 0.099*** -0.037 
 (0.036) (0.053) (0.037) (0.094) (0.035) (0.093) (0.034) (0.097) 
Constant 2.593 
0.660 2.104 12.366 2.085 8.578 
2.830 8.902 
 (1.942) (3.084) (2.881) (7.014) (2.918) (7.482) (2.208) (8.789) 
         
 Observations 17 17 17 17 23 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.39 0.56 0.54 0.31 0.28 0.19 0.62 0.19 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 7.  Determinants of discretionary spending 
 
 1981 1990-91 2001 2008-09 2001 2008-09 2001 2008-09 
         
Left -0.005 -0.001 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.009 -0.036 -0.170* 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.029) (0.088) 
Non-elderly social spending -0.210** 0.020 -0.231** -0.173 -0.199*** -0.102 -0.416*** -0.303 
 (0.083) (0.158) (0.086) (0.158) (0.065) (0.160) (0.133) (0.176) 
Left*spending       0.003* 0.012* 
       (0.002) (0.006) 
         
GDP 
-0.317** 
-0.084 
-0.186 
0.100 
-0.209* 
-0.002 -0.119 0.052 
 (0.143) (0.284) (0.173) (0.208) (0.115) (0.217) (0.119) (0.201) 
Debt 0.013 -0.037* -0.008 0.000 -0.007 0.002 -0.003 -0.010 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.014) 
Globalization -0.013 0.062 0.016 0.023 0.008 0.030 0.037 0.019 
 (0.022) (0.055) (0.027) (0.056) (0.021) (0.059) (0.025) (0.054) 
Constant 3.014** -0.671 2.008 2.814 2.196 0.735 2.470 5.557 
 (1.195) (3.186) (2.116) (4.201) (1.757) (4.689) (1.652) (4.904) 
         
Observations 17 17 17 17 23 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.50 0.37 0.44 0.24 0.44 0.08 0.54 0.27 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 8.  Discretionary spending increases under different constellations of partisanship 
and size of welfare state, 2008-09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Bold numbers are unweighted averages.  
 Left majority 20-50% No Left 
    
>14% GDP NO: 3.85 AT: 1.35 DK: 1.92 
  ES: 2.84 BE: 2.93   FI: 2.76 
 UK: 3.02 DE: 1.61  FR: 1.13 
  LU: 5.01 SE: -1.04 
  NL: 2.87  
    
 3.24 
 
2.75 
 
1.19 
 
    
<14% GDP AU: 2.31 CH: 0.87 CN: 3.04 
 PT: 3.10  GR: 3.25 
   IE:  2.10 
   JP:  2.05 
   US: 2.37 
    
 2.71 
 
.87 
 
2.56 
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Figure 1.  The marginal effect of Left cabinet share conditional on the size of the welfare 
state, 2008-09 
 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 Recent work by David Soskice and collaborators (e.g., Carlin & Soskice 2009; Iversen & Soskice 2012) also 
makes the case for ‘bringing the macro-economic dimension back in’. 
2 Put differently, it is important to distinguish between shifts in the ‘center of gravity’ in partisan politics and 
convergence or divergence between parties (see Kwon & Pontusson 2010). 
3 The experience of the Great Recession illustrates the electoral vulnerability of Right governments in small 
welfare states.  Among the countries that we categorize as small welfare states (see below), there are four clear-
cut instances of incumbent Right parties facing elections between the onset of the financial crisis in October 
2007 and the end of 2010 (Australia in November 2007, the US in November 2008, Japan in August 2009, and 
Greece in October 2009).  In every instance, the incumbent party was defeated.  Among large welfare states, by 
contrast, incumbent Right parties were the clear winners in every election that occurred over the same time 
period, gaining the office of prime minister in the Netherlands (September 2010) and retaining it in Germany 
(September 2009) and Sweden (September 2010). 
4 This argument draws inspiration from Garrett and Way’s (1999) analysis of divergent interests (or incentives) 
of public-sector unions and unions in trade-exposed sectors. 
5 See Amable and Azizi (2011) and Toloudis (2012) for divergent empirical assessments of varieties of 
capitalism as an approach to fiscal policy.  
6 The findings reported below remain very similar if we adopt alternative thresholds and therefore different 
windows of analysis.  
7 Amable and Azizi (2011) employ an earlier, very similar OECD measure of fiscal stimulus.  For alternative 
measures, see Armingeon (2012), Cameron (2012) and Dellepiane and Hardiman (2012).  All the fiscal policy 
data presented in this paper are from OECD, Economic Outlook (online), No. 84 for 1980-1995 and No. 92 for 
1996-2010. 
8 We have excluded two cases of GDP contraction of less than .25% (Australia in 1981 and Austria in 1990-91).  
In these cases, our formula produces (very large) numbers that do not seem very meaningful.  
9 See Döring and Schwander (forthcoming) for a critical discussion of literature using Left cabinet shares as the 
measure of government partisanship.  The pros and cons of alternative measures of government partisanship is a 
topic that we simply must set aside for the time being.  
10 Needless to say perhaps, the small number of country-years with Left government renders generalizations 
about the early 1980s very tenuous. 
11 Robust standard errors are generally smaller than the conventional standard errors reported in Tables 6-7.  
Based on conventional standard errors, our tests of statistical significance are conservative.   
12 For data on cabinet shares, we rely on Armingeon et al. (2012).  Non-elderly social spending in percent of 
GDP is measured as total public social expenditures minus old-age expenditures (OECD.Stat).  In our view, this 
represents a better measure of social protection against the effects of economic downturns than total social 
spending.  The data on real GDP growth (expenditure approach) are also from OECD.Stat.  The data on public 
debt, measured as general government gross financial liabilities as a percentage of GDP, are from OECD, 
Economic Outlook (online), No. 75 for 1980 and 1989; No. 92 for 2000 and 2007.  The data on economic 
globalization, a composite variable comprising trade, FDI and portfolio investment, are from the KOF Index of 
Globalization (see Dreher 2006; data available at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch). 
13 Our results for the Great Recession are consistent with those of Toloudis (2012) and Armingeon (2012).  
14 Yet another possible explanation of the discrepancies between Table 5 and Tables 6-7 is that the former relies 
on a dichotomous categorization of government partisanship while the analysis presented in Tables 6-7 employs 
a continuous measure.    
15 This result is robust to the inclusion of a dummy for EMU, alternative coding of US Democrats and Canadian 
Liberals as Left parties, alternative sample sizes, and using data for 2001-02. 
16 The interaction effect for the Great Recession is robust to the stepwise inclusion of a dummy for EMU, a 
dummy for Greece, Iceland and Ireland as cases of IMF/EU bailout, and two alternative measures of the size of 
banking bailouts in 2008-09 (based on data from Laeven and Valencia 2011).  It is also robust to the stepwise 
exclusion of any of the reported controls and holds up if we substitute change in unemployment for change in 
GDP or re-code US Democrats and Canadian Liberals as ‘Left parties’.  The exclusion of Greece and/or Ireland, 
commonly characterized as having pursued strict pro-cyclical policies in 2008-09 (Armingeon 2012; Dellapiane 
& Hardiman 2012), leave the result unchanged.  In contrast, the interaction result for the early 2000s is not 
particularly robust: it does not hold up when we control for EMU, exclude Greece and/or Ireland, or include data 
for 2002. 
17 Results available upon request.  Following Garrett, we measured ‘labor encompassment’ as the sum of 
standardized scores for union density and centralization of wage bargaining (with data from Visser 2013). 
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18 Our decision to use 14% as the cut-off between large and small welfare states was motivated by the fact that 
the marginal-effects line in Figure 1 crosses zero at 14% and by the fact that four countries are clustered right 
around the 23-country average for non-elderly social spending in percent of GDP in 2007 (14.6%).  With 14% as 
the cut-off, these countries (Norway, New Zealand, Spain and the UK) are all coded as large welfare states. 
19 Note that Starke et al. (2013) question the utility of using budget data to gauge policy responses to economic 
downturns and instead focus on legislative policy enactments.  They would presumably not approve of the way 
that we test their argument in this paper. 
20 We measured ‘dualization’ as the strictness of employment protection against individual and collective 
dismissals for workers with a regular contract (OECD.Stat).  
